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Abstract
In this paper we empirically test three of the most significant theories about the emergence of a 
European identity. The three approaches considered here are, respectively: first, a "cultural" theory, 
which understands identities as being based on ethno-cultural factors generated through a long-
term (historical) process; second, an "instrumental" theory, which conceives of identities as being 
based on self-interested calculation (whether economic or political); and a third "civic" theory, 
which understands identities as being based on agreement over rules for peaceful political co-
existence. Our empirical test of these theories exploits Eurobarometer data. In recent years, many 
researchers have become increasingly dissatisfied with the way these surveys poll attitudes towards 
the EU. 
We have contributed to this debate by designing special new questions to measure national and 
European identities which were included in Eurobarometer 57.2 and are used here for this analysis.
Our results provide only partial support for the theories mentioned above. We find that national and 
European identities are compatible. This is, in part, because while national identities are largely 
"cultural", European identities are primarily "instrumental". However, we also find that there is a 
sufficient European common "cultural" ground for a European identity to emerge. We have also 
confirmed that, because national and European identities are different, the development of a 
European identity does not necessarily imply the transfer of loyalties from the national to the 
supranational level. In all the countries analysed here, attachment to the nation remains strong, and 
certainly greater than attachment to Europe. We also show that it is harder for a European identity 
to develop in countries with a strong sense of national pride.
Kurzfassung
In diesem Papier werden drei der bedeutendsten Theorien über die Entstehung einer europäischen 
Identität empirisch getestet. Die entsprechenden drei hier untersuchten Zugänge sind: Erstens eine 
"kulturelle" Theorie, welche Identitäten als auf ethno-kulturellen Faktoren basierend versteht, die 
sich durch einen langfristigen (historischen) Prozess entwickeln; zweitens eine "instrumentelle" 
Theorie, die Identitäten auf der Basis einer durch Eigeninteresse motivierten Kalkulation denkt 
(entweder wirtschaftlich oder politisch); und drittens eine "staatsbürgerliche" Theorie, welche 
Identitäten als auf einer Vereinbarung über Regeln einer friedvollen politischen Koexistenz 
basierend versteht. 
Unser empirischer Test dieser Theorien wertet Eurobarometer-Daten aus. In den vergangenen 
Jahren wurde eine Reihe von Wissenschaftern zusehends unzufriedener mit der Art, wie diese 
Erhebungen Einstellungen gegenüber der EU abfragen. Wir haben zu dieser Debatte beigetragen, 
indem wir spezielle, neue Fragen zur Messung nationaler und Europäischer Identitäten entwickelt 
haben, welche in Eurobarometer 57.2 aufgenommen wurden und hier für diese Analyse verwendet 
werden. 
Unsere Ergebnisse bieten nur teilweise Unterstützung für die oben genannten Theorien. Wir finden, 
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Identiäten weitgehend "kulturell", hingegen europäische Identitäten in erster Linie "instrumentell" 
sind. Wir finden jedoch auch, dass es ausreichende "kulturelle" europäische Gemeinsamkeiten, als 
Grundlage für die Entwicklung einer Europäischen Identität, gibt. Wir haben auch bestätigt, dass, 
da nationale und europäische Identitäten unterschiedlich sind, die Entwicklung einer europäischen 
Identität nicht notwendigerweise einen Transfer von Loyalitäten von der nationalen auf die 
supranationale Ebene impliziert. In allen hier analysierten Ländern bleibt die Verbundenheit zur 
Nation stark und sicherlich größer als die Verbundenheit mit Europa. Wir zeigen auch, dass die 
Entwicklung einer europäischen Identität in Ländern mit einem starken Sinn für Nationalstolz 
schwieriger ist.
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1. Theoretical approaches to the emergence of a European 
identity and its compatibility with national identities  
Research into European identity has evolved recently in two quite different directions, with very few 
contact between the two strands.(1) On the one hand, we find a number of theoretical and normative 
approaches which focus on the definition of the concept of European identity, but which have rarely 
been subjected to empirical testing with attitudinal data (Orchard 2002). On the other, there are a 
number of empirical approaches, mainly developed by sociologists and social psychologists, but 
which lack the necessary theoretical and methodological underpinning.(2) The analysis of European 
identity presented in this article cuts a middle path between these two dominant approaches to the 
subject. We introduce a number of existing theories about the potential emergence of a European 
identity and test them by using the most appropriate empirical data to answer the questions each 
poses. Our contribution to the field lies not, therefore, in the development of new theories or the 
presentation of unexpected empirical findings, but rather in the way this analysis empirically tests 
existing theories. Such a test is, of course, necessary if our knowledge of European identity is to go 
beyond the mere “history of a concept and a discourse” (Stråth 2002: 288). 
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Greatly simplifying existing theories about the emergence of a European identity, we have identified 
three main tendencies in the literature, distinguished by the different possible sources of European 
identification they defend. We have labelled these three approaches the “cultural”, “instrumental”, 
and “civic” theories. A general common preoccupation, within these theories, is the relation between 
citizens’ European and national identities. This has not been the object of systematic empirical 
research either. When at the end of the 1980s the EU launched a number of policies aimed at 
creating a European identity, the member states responded by incorporating into the Maastricht 
Treaty a clause stating that the Union should respect the member states’ respective national identities 
(article F, point 1). This reaction, along with the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity and the 
rejection of the word “federal”, revealed that, in line with the “cultural” theory’s conception of 
identities, many member states saw the creation of a European identity as a potential threat to their 
own national identities and their citizens’ national loyalties. Indeed, in the early 1990s national 
identity was used by the political elites to justify their defence of independent statehood and 
sovereignty. Due to the close links between national identity and national independence, many 
experts have argued that the European integration process could be seen as a threat to, and 
incompatible with, national identity (Höjelid 2001), and hence difficult to achieve. 
Along with these pessimistic visions of the creation of European identity, we also find optimists who 
do not conceive European identity in zero-sum terms or see it as incompatible with national identity 
(Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001; Kersbergen 1997; Weiler 1999). Some authors believe that the 
increasing globalisation of communications and the economy is weakening popular interest in 
national, domestic concerns to the benefit of stronger identification with issues beyond national 
borders (Cerutti 1992). Advocates of such interpretations would highlight the growing importance of 
values with relatively universal appeal, such as human rights, the protection of civil liberties, social 
rights, and democracy. Other analysts conclude that EU integration actually strengthens the nation-
state, making it more effective and strengthening governments’ capacity to tackle global and 
multidimensional problems which require complex coordination, regulatory and enforcement 
institutions etc. (Milward 2000; Moracscik 1998). 
Those who remain sceptical about the potential development of a European identity reject the notion 
that citizens can possess more than one identity simultaneously, whereas other authors have noted 
that people can hold multiple identities, each deriving from the same source of human attachment 
(conceptualised as kind of “concentric circles” with different levels of intensity), or feel 
simultaneously attached to multiple identities based on different subjective factors of identification 
(Weiler 1999: 345; Kersbergen 1997: 11). Although little empirical research has been carried out 
into these questions, there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that attachments to multiple 
identities draw on different sources (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001: 234). 
1.1. The “cultural” theory: content and empirical hypotheses implications  
The group of scholars that we identify with the “cultural” theory argue that if a European identity 
were to emerge, it would not, and should not, be based on the same elements (such as a common 
cultural heritage, language, myths, symbols and emotional bonds) which form the foundations of 
national identities (see Smith 1992, 1995, 1999; Østerud 1999). According to Østerud (1999), an EU 
identity could be established in two ways. One would emulate “classical” nation-building of the type 
seen during the 19th century, but now developing at the European level and including an attempt to 
construct a stronger European identity. However, such a process might be more problematic than in 
the case of nation states, due to a number of cultural, linguistic, economical and geopolitical factors. 
Cultural diversity and structural differences are deeply rooted and, as a result, expectations of the 
emergence of a European identity should be regarded as rather utopian. While it may be possible for 
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From this theory we can develop a number of hypotheses for empirical test: 
1. National identities are mainly based on “cultural” elements.  
2. European identities would not be based on “cultural” elements.  
3. Lacking “cultural” basis, European identities would be weaker than national identities.  
4. If a European “cultural” identity would emerge it would compete with national “cultural” 
identities, this meaning the wakening of citizens’ attachment to national identity (in a kind of 
zero-sum game).  
5. Therefore, a) citizens with strong national identities will not develop/hold European identities 
at the same time; and b) countries in which the majority of citizens hold “cultural” national 
identities will have a lower percentage of dual identities, or European identity, holders.  
1.2. The “instrumental” theory: content and empirical hypotheses implications  
For a second group of scholars, who we have identified as proponents of the “instrumental” theory, 
European identities would be consciously decided on, and are thus based on calculated individual 
self-interest. A numbers of authors argue that instrumental factors may play an important role in 
defining and strengthening individuals’ sense of identity (Brass 1979; Cinnerella 1997). The 
perception of the potential gains or losses that might result from membership of a given social group 
may influence peoples’ identification with it. The more people consider their country to lack 
sufficient decision-making power within the international context, the more strongly they identify 
with Europe. From this instrumental perspective, the better the citizen’s evaluation of the results of 
European policies (compared to the results of policies pursued by national government), the more 
likely s/he is to feel European. This cost-benefit understanding of identities implies that low welfare 
spending, poor economic performance, and low-quality national-level democracy would all make 
citizens more likely to feel more European (Gabel 1998; Eichemberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel and 
Palmer 1995; Kaltenthaler and Anderson 2001; Olsen 1996; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Fernández-
Albertos and Sánchez-Cuenca 2001).(3) 
There is a number of empirical hypotheses implied, some of which we will be able to test with the 
Eurobarometer 57.2 data: 
1. Both national and European identities are based on “instrumental” considerations.  
2. European identities are basically and mainly “instrumental”, while “cultural” and “civic” 
elements play a minor role.  
3. Those citizens with weaker national identities develop stronger European identities.  
4. In those countries with higher percentage of citizens holding dual, or European, identities the 
attachment to the nation would be weaker than in countries with higher percentage of 
exclusive national identity holders.  
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1.3. The “civic” theory: content and empirical hypothesis implications  
Finally, a third line of analysis, which we have labelled the “civic” theory, stresses the development 
of identities around agreement over rules for peaceful political co-existence, shared cultural norms, 
and common beliefs (Mancini 1998:8; Weiler 1999: 346; Kersbergen 1997). From this perspective, 
the substance of EU membership (and European identity) lies in a commitment to the shared values 
of the Union as expressed in its constituent documents, a commitment to the duties and rights of a 
civic society covering specific areas of public life, a commitment to membership of a polity which 
promotes the direct opposite of classic ethno-nationalism, that is, human characteristics which 
transcend the differences at the heart of organic ethno-culturalism (Weiler, Haltern and Mayer 1995: 
23). Drawing on deliberative theories of democracy and Habermasian conceptions of communicative 
rationality, the emergence of a European public sphere would be crucial for the emergence of a 
European identity (Eriksen and Fossum 2001). 
The hypotheses to be derived from this stream are the following: 
1. Whatever the components of national identities, a European identity would be based on “civic”
elements.  
2. A European identity based on “civic” elements would be compatible, that is, would no 
weaken, national identities. Therefore, a strong (civic) European demos is possible.  
We have used these debates to select the different items and dimensions to be examined in this 
article. We provide empirical information relevant to each of the debates and hypotheses, which are 
then brought together and discussed in more detail in the conclusions. Our main findings are that 
European and national identities are compatible because: a) they are conceptually different and b) of 
a different order, involving different notions of loyalty. Eurobarometer studies have shown that they 
are more or less compatible, but the question of why this is so, and how and why they differ, has not 
been studied. While national identities were largely constructed during the specific historical, socio-
economic and political circumstances of the era of nation-state building, European identity is still 
under construction involving, and presupposing the existence of national identities without replacing 
them. We also argue that national identities, which are deeply rooted in history, impose inertias and 
dynamics that affect the way European identities are seen and understood in individual countries. 
2. Data  
This analysis is based on Eurobarometer data. In recent years many researchers have become 
increasingly dissatisfied with the way these surveys poll attitudes towards the EU, and particularly 
with the quantitative indicators used to measured identities. We have contributed to this debate by 
designing special new questions to measure national and European identities for Eurobarometer 
57.2, and then examining the results in this analysis. These new questions will enable us to discover 
whether the two identities are similar (and can be measured using the same kind of indicators) or 
different (which would call for different instruments to measure each identity).  
The data analysed here come from national, probability (multistage) samples from the EU member 
states, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.(4) Samples were taken of the resident population 
aged 15 or over in each country. Details on the participants in the Standard Eurobarometer 57.2 are 
given in the table below.(5) 
Table 1
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Before proceeding with the analysis, we eliminated non-nationals from the country samples. The 
analysis refers, therefore, exclusively to citizens of the countries in question. We applied weighting 
for the member states and accession countries, so each sample totals 1,000 respondents, thereby 
making the same contribution to the aggregate analysis. When carrying out some analyses we also 
centered the data. Finally, we have imputed missing values.(6) Although we found only a small 
percentage of missing values for individual questions, for the questionnaire as a whole we lost about 
half our respondents on these grounds. Attribution was, therefore, recommendable. We have rounded 
the values obtained through attribution to match the previous categories. 
3. Definitions and measurements  
The Standard Eurobarometer 57.2 is particularly well-suited to test the theoretical debates discussed 
above. It contains one battery of questions measuring closeness to different in-groups and out-groups 
(including the nation, the EU, Europe and Central and Eastern Europe) and two batteries of questions 
measuring the dimensions held to be most relevant for identification with the nation and Europe. 
These last two sets of questions have not figured in previous or subsequent Eurobarometers or 
similar studies and will help us establish whether both types of identities can be, in fact, measured 
through just one or several questions put exactly the same way, as is standard practice in 
Eurobarometer studies. 
We use the indicator “closeness to different groups of people” to measure identity. We consider that 
it has advantages over the indicators used in other Eurobarometers to assess European identity, such 
as “citizenship”, “support for European integration” and “pride in being European”. Since one of our 
main goals is to distinguish different possible sources of European and national identities, a useful 
definition of identity could begin with David Easton’s concept of political community (1965). He 
provides a definition of national identity which is also applicable to European identity: it is open, in 
the sense that it does not refer to the sources of this identity, and it is easy to operationalise for cross-
country comparisons. Translating Easton’s definition of national identity to European identity we 
may define European identity: “as a we-feeling or a ‘sense of community’ that consists of the feeling 
of belonging together as a group which, because it shares a political structure, also share a political 
fate” (Easton 1965: 185). The question of the relative importance of different elements as the source 
of European and national identification, and whether they constitute a single or several dimensions, 
is a matter of empirical investigation that we will analyse in this article. “Closeness” is, therefore, the 
indicator we will use to measure identity. “Citizenship” can be understood as being more closely 
related to rights and duties (and the “civic” theory), and “support for integration” as more closely 
connected to economic (as well as perhaps political) costs and benefits (and the “instrumental” 
theory). In this sense, “closeness” is a more neutral notion. This is not meant to imply that any of the 
possible components of identity mentioned in the previous section are more important than others, 
and therefore it is better than citizenship and support for integration to measure identity as defined by 
Easton. “Pride”, on the other hand, could be defined as the positive effect that results from feelings 
of identity (not identity itself). The question on closeness that we will use includes level of closeness 
to some “in-groups” (those living in the same city, region, and nation), to EU citizens, fellow 
Europeans and people living in Central and Eastern Europe. It also included nine “out-groups” (both 
internal and external).(7) Six of those nine “out-group” are common to all countries; the other three 
represent the largest immigrant groups in each. 
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The two batteries of questions measuring the elements perceived as most significant for 
identification with the nation and Europe include a set of 14 items, each related to different 
components of identity mentioned in the section above. We have not established a predetermined 
and closed theoretical classification of these items as belonging to the different “civic”, 
“instrumental” and “civic” concepts of identity. How nationals of different countries categorize them 
is a question for empirical research. Nonetheless, the inclusion of these items in the questionnaire 
responded to the following hypothesised grouping of items. In the case of national identities, 
common culture, customs and traditions, common language, common ancestry and common history 
and destiny are related to the “cultural” conception of identity; common rights and duties and a 
common political and legal systems are linked to the “civic” theory; a common system of social 
security/welfare is associated with the “instrumental” theory about identities, as are, probably, 
national economy, national army and common borders.(8) We have also included some other items 
which, although not manifestly related to any of these three theories, could be termed “affective-
symbolic” components of identity; these include national independence and sovereignty, national 
pride, national character and national symbols. 
We suggest a similar grouping of items with respect to European identity. Common civilisation, 
membership of a European society with many languages and cultures, a sense of common ancestry 
and common history and destiny pertain to the “cultural” theory as applied to a European identity; an 
emerging common political and legal systems and common rights and duties are more closely related 
to the “civic” conception of European identity; and a common system of social protection and the 
right to freedom of movement and residence are linked to the “instrumental” vision of identity, as 
are, probably, the future European defence system, common borders and a single currency. (9) We 
also included pride in being European, in the sovereingty of the EU or in a set of European Union 
symbols as more closely related to an “affective-symbolic” conception of identities. 
In these last two batteries of questions the respondent had the option to answer “I do not feel 
national/European”. In these cases, the interviewer did not proceed with the remaining questions in 
each battery. Except in Great Britain, this option was not offered as a prior filter, but only recorded if 
the respondent spontaneously mentioned the idea. This poses a problem for comparative analysis, 
since we found that as many as 62 percent of British respondents did in fact state that they did not 
feel European. Since we attributed the missing values, this could distort the validity of the results for 
the Great Britain. However, in order to test for this we ran some of the analyses shown below first 
with, and then without, imputation for the British case, and obtained virtually the same results on 
both occasions. Therefore, even in the British case we opted to attribute the missing values, as doing 
so does not seriously disrupt the analysis. 
One shortcoming of our analysis is the fact that it is essentially static, while both individual and 
collective identities are in fact dynamic, changing over time. In the light of this, we have opted to 
compare and analyse the differences between countries. This kind of analysis can be considered 
dynamic to the extent that it shows differences among countries. Nonetheless, the reader should 
remain aware that the data simply constitutes a snapshot in time and depicts identities as being more 
stable than they really are.(10)  
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4. National and European identities: trends, inclusiveness and 
main components  
4.1. Trends in national and European identifications 
The percentage of people expressing a sense of attachment to their respective nations remains quite 
high, even if we also find evidence of an emerging European identity. If we compare the attachment 
to both identities, it would appear that national loyalties have yet to be transferred to this new 
European identity. 
Let us begin our analysis by considering whether there has been any transfer of national identities to 
the supranational or European level as the hypotheses derived from the “cultural” (number four) and 
“instrumental” (number four) theories would suggest. The answer to this question can be gleaned 
from the results given in Tables 2 and 3, which shows the percentage of people who feel close to the 
nation (Table 2) and Europe (Table 3).(11) 
Table 2 
Table 3 
In the case of national identities (Table 2), only if we confine our analysis to the figures of those who 
feel “very close” to the nation can we speak in terms of an erosion of national identities between 
1995 and 2002.(12) If we consider those who feel both “close” and “very close”, we find no 
evidence of such a tendency; when both responses are included, national identities have weakened 
only in Germany (East), Austria and the Czech Republic, but even in these countries the vast 
majority of the population remains attached the nation, with figures ranging from 71.8 percent in the 
Czech Republic to 81.3 percent in Austria. 
Even more obviously, whatever the extent of the weakening of national identities, loyalties have not 
been transferred from the nation to Europe (Carey 2002: 388). The common pattern found across all 
the countries in the study is a decline in feelings of closeness to Europe (table 3). This is the case 
whether we consider the percentage of the “very close” or the percentage of both the “very close” 
plus the “close”.(13) This suggests that other factors must be responsible for the weakening of 
political attachments at both the national and European levels; the nature of these, however, is a topic 
which lies beyond the scope of this article. 
Regarding the hypotheses derived from the three theories above, the data in these tables do not 
confirm that the emergence of European identities weakens national identities as implied by the 
“cultural” and “instrumental” theory, both of which present attachment to different levels of identity 
as zero-sum games (as if a person has a fixed quantity of identity to be split among different levels of 
attachment or kinds of identities, so which ever quantity of identity is put in one level or identity 
must be subtracted from the other -hypotheses number four in the “cultural” and “instrumental” 
theories-). Although these data are too broad to confirm hypothesis number two on the “civic” 
theory, they tend to back the idea that national and European identities are compatible. However, at 
this stage we cannot say if this is so because the European identity is mainly based on “civic” 
elements as the “civic” theory suggest (hypothesis number two). 
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4.2 Inclusiveness: compatibility of national and European identities  
Regardless of whether national and European identities have increased or decreased in recent years, 
we are still left with the task of ascertaining how they are defined and whether or not they are 
compatible. Our findings suggest that both national and European identities are inclusive; that is, we 
find a relatively high proportion of respondents with dual identities (ie. citizens who feel close to 
both their nation and Europe at the same time) in all the countries. The two identities are inclusive 
(or compatible), but not of equal intensity. Attachment to national identities is still stronger than 
attachment to European identities, even in those countries where citizens with dual identities 
outnumber those with exclusively national identity. Hence, these findings confirm that, as suggested 
above, the emergence of a European identity does not threaten attachment to national identities. 
While we have little empirical data on the compatibility of national and European identities, it does 
seem that there is some variation among countries in this regard: national and European identities 
seem to be less compatible in the United Kingdom and Sweden than in France, Luxembourg and 
Italy (Goldmann 2002: 296).(14) Goldmann and Gilland (2001) relate this finding to the differing 
importance of what they call the “civic” as opposed to the “ethnic” dimension of identities in those 
countries. Our own empirical research has produced similar conclusions in some, but not all respects.
Let us consider the question of the compatibility (inclusiveness) or incompatibility (exclusiveness) of 
national and European identities. To that end we have calculated, for each country, the proportion of 
the population expressing simultaneous attachment (closeness) to both the nation and Europe, as well 
as various measures of the strengh of their attachments to each of these identities. These data are 
included in Table 4. 
Table 4 
The first point to be highlighted from this table is that national and European identities do not, in 
fact, seem to be incompatible (that is, exclusive). The percentage of respondents expressing dual 
identities (those who feel close to both their nation and Europe, shown in the first column) is quite 
high in all the countries. Nonetheless, this figure ranges from 36 and 40 percent of the total in Great 
Britain and Greece, respectively, to 64 and 61 percent in Italy and Spain. Looking at the same data 
from a different perspective (subtracting the percentage of people with exclusively national identities 
from the percentage of dual identities holders, shown in the second column), exclusively national 
identities are still held by a significant number of citizens of Great Britain and Greece, above all, but 
are also common in Germany (East and West) and the Czech Republic.(15) Therefore, from the first 
two columns in Table 4 we could conclude that national and European identities are compatible to 
some extend in all countries (rejecting hypotheses number four from the “cultural” and 
“instrumental” theories, and backing hypothesis number two from the “civic” theory). But the 
second column does also pose a question: is the variation in the net percentage of population with 
dual identities caused by the different importance of “cultural”, “instrumental” and “civic” elements 
of attachment in each country? We shall answer this last question in the following section. But 
before, and equally significantly, even in those countries where more citizens have dual than 
exclusively national identities, attachment to national identities is still stronger than attachment to 
European identities (the median value of subtracting median identification with the EU from median 
identification with the nation is always favourable to the nation, shown in the third column).(16) In 
other words, there is no correlation between a higher proportion of the population with dual identities 
and a relatively lower attachment to the nation. This finding tends to bear out the theory of 
concentric circles of attachments to different identities. The nation would be the inner, more 
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In terms of the hypotheses outlined before, the data would back partially hypothesis number three 
from the “cultural” theory (European identities are weak in comparison to national identities, 
although we cannot yet assure if that would the consequence of the European identity lacking 
“cultural” foundations) and hypothesis number two from the “civic” theory (European and national 
identities are compatible, although we cannot yet assure, either, if that would be consequence of the 
European identity being based in “civic” elements). However, the evidence in the table would reject 
hypothesis number four and five from the “cultural” theory and hypothesis number four from the 
“instrumental” theory, since the emergence of a European identity does not weaken the strong 
attachment to the nation. In fact, stronger attachment to the nation is a feature common to all the 
countries (see that all the figures in the third column in Table 4 are positive). Furthermore, the 
strength of the bonds to the nation is similar in Great Britain (0.758), where exclusive national 
identities are predominant, and in Spain (0.718), where dual identities holders outnumber exclusive 
national identity holders. The same is true regarding West Germany (0.715) and the Czech Republic 
(0.748), or Greece (1.099) and Hungary (1.043). 
On this basis, and substantiating our earlier point regarding the absence of any transfer of loyalties 
from the nation to the supranational or European level, we can confirm that the emergence of a 
European identity does not threaten attachment to national identities. In fact the proportion of the 
population holding exclusively European identities (feeling “very close” or “quite close” to Europe 
but “not very close” or “not at all close” to their nation) is quite low, ranging from between 9 and 8 
percent in Great Britain and West Germany and 1 percent in Hungary and Poland. 
4.3. The main components of national and European identities  
Having established the apparent compatibility of national and European identities, we should ask 
whether this compatibility is a result of the two identities having different meanings? Grosso modo, 
we have found that the nation is mainly defined in “cultural” terms, in contrast to attachment to 
Europe, which draws above all on “instrumental” considerations. This distinction may help account 
for their compatibility and, on the other hand, explain why loyalties are not transferred from the 
national to the supranational level. However, these different meanings are not entirely consistent 
across countries, in that “cultural” factors appear to be more important for citizens in the Central and, 
above all, Eastern European countries, while “instrumental” considerations are more important for 
citizens in Western and Southern member states. The cases of Hungary and the Czech Republic, in 
particular, suggest that even if attachments to multiple identities derive from the same “cultural” 
sources, national and European identities may still be compatible. Finally, we find that it is the 
“affective-symbolic” attachment to the nation that seems to hinder the development of a European 
identity, while “civic-based” attachment to both the nation and Europe favours the inclusiveness of 
these two identities. 
Table 5 
Table 5 lists the five items identified as the most important grounds for national and European 
identification in each country. We have included some data from Table 4 which should also be taken 
into account in this context (net percentage of dual identities holders and comparative attachment to 
national and European identities). This table makes it possible to begin exploring the dimensions of 
identification, and hence to gain a deeper understanding of the compatibility or otherwise of national 
and European identities.(17) 
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A first, vague impression is that attachment to the nation is largely defined in “cultural” terms 
(language and culture happens to be mentioned among the five most important items for national 
identity in virtually all the countries), while attachment to Europe is mainly based on “instrumental” 
considerations (the common currency -economy- and the right of free movement and residence is a 
recurrent element among the five most important items of European identity in virtually all 
countries). This is even more clearly shown in Table 6 and 7, which are simpler summaries from 
table 5 to make it more easily understandable. 
Table 6 
Table 7 
Table 6 shows the five items that were most frequently mentioned among the five most important for 
national identification (we ranked the items according to their average importance and selected the 
five highest averages in each country). Some of these items were selected in all countries, while 
others were only relevant for a few or even a single country. The table also shows the number of 
times the item ranked first in the list of items. All countries mentioned a common language among 
the five most important elements for national identification, eight mentioned common culture, 
customs and traditions and common ancestry and seven referred to a common history and a common 
destiny. All the first-placed items mentioned correspond to the “cultural” theory of identities. 
Therefore, we can conclude that national identity is largely defined in “cultural” (or ethno-cultural) 
terms, therefore baking strongly hypothesis number one of the “cultural” theory (national identities 
are mainly based on “cultural” elements). Table 7 provides the same information, but in this case for 
European identities. The right to freedom of movement and residence in any part of the EU and a 
single currency were mentioned in nine and eight countries respectively. Other items such as 
language and culture or civilisation were also identified as important. That is, the most frequently 
mentioned items include those that belong to the “instrumental” conception of identity, while others 
corresponding to the “cultural” theory are also mentioned. This finding supports partially the 
hypothesis number two of the “instrumental” theory, since European identities seem to be based 
mainly in instrumental considerations. Nonetheless, the role played by “cultural” elements cannot be 
considered minor, especially in Central and Eastern European member states, where they rank higher 
than instrumental considerations. However, the important finding here, if we take the results shown 
in Tables 6 and 7 together, is the varying degrees of emphasis placed on instrumental items. In fact, 
this constitutes the main difference between national- and European-level identities. This plainly 
reject hypothesis number one from the “instrumental” theory (European and national identities are 
both based on “instrumental” considerations) and the “civic” theory (European identities are based 
mainly in “civic” elements). The evidence is debatable regarding hypothesis two from the “cultural” 
theory, since “cultural” elements seem to play also a role in European identities together with 
“instrumental” considerations. These findings might strengthen the hypothesis that it is possible to 
have attachments to multiple identities as long as such attachments derive from different sources. 
That is, national and European identities would be compatible insofar as attachment to the nation is 
based on “cultural” elements, and to Europe on “instrumental” considerations. 
While this pattern applies in all the countries, we find that the two identities are more compatible in 
some countries than in others. This can be seen coming back to Table 5 and introducing in the 
analysis the information extracted from Table 4. 
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Looking at the net percentage of the population with dual identities,(18) it can be seen that it varies 
in different countries, even when they share similar sources of national (“cultural” elements) and 
European identification (“instrumental” elements). Take Great Britain and Italy as an example, 
“cultural” elements are important for the national identity of citizens in both countries (both have 
language and culture among the five most important items for national identification), while 
“instrumental” elements are equally important in both countries for the European identity of their 
citizens (common currency and the right of free movement and residence are mentioned among the 
five most important items for European identity), however exclusive national identity holders 
outnumber dual identities holders in Great Britain by 28 points, while in Italy the situation is exactly 
the contrary: dual identity holders outnumber exclusively national identity holders by exactly 28 
points. 
Moreover, Eastern European countries (and Central European countries to a certain extent) diverge 
from the general pattern described here, in that “cultural” (as opposed “instrumental”) considerations 
are important both for their European and national identifications.(19) The cases of Hungary and the 
Czech Republic, in particular, suggest that even if attachments to multiple identities derive from the 
same “cultural” sources, national and European identities may still be compatible, therefore opposing 
hypotheses number two and five from the “cultural” theory (that is, European identities would no be 
based on “cultural” elements, and citizens with strong national identities would not develop 
European identities). Furthermore, if we take into account that in both countries dual identity holders 
(as measured by the net inclusiveness) outnumber exclusive national identity holders by eight points 
and that the bonds to the nation (as measured by the comparative attachment) are still stronger that 
the attachment to Europe we can also reject the hypothesis number four from the “cultural” theory. 
That is, the emergence of a European identity based in “cultural” elements similar to those of 
national identity does no endanger or weaken national identities and loyalties. 
What, therefore, makes identities compatible or incompatible? We can rule out differences in the 
relative importance of “cultural” elements of attachment to the nation, an explanation suggested by 
Goldmann and Gilland (2001), since this is a pattern which is more or less common to all the 
countries while the net percentage of dual identity holders varies considerably among them. 
Accordingly, one way of attempting to answer this question is by focusing on the countries with the 
highest and lowest level of compatibility between the two types of identities. The countries where 
identities are least compatible are Great Britain and Greece, while the countries in which the two 
identities are most compatible are Italy and Spain. What have each of these two pairs of countries in 
common which makes them different from the rest? Great Britain and Greece are the only two 
countries where pride is mentioned among the five most important items for national identification. 
Great Britain is the only country that mentions sovereignty, and where we find the lowest level of 
compatibility between national and European identification. Italy and Spain are the only two 
countries in which rights and duties figure among the five most important items for both national and 
European identification. This suggests that a strong feeling of national pride and attachment to 
national sovereignty may hinder the development of a European identity, but it does not presupose 
that the national identity in those countries is more “culturally” based. National pride and attachment 
to national sovereignty may also be linked to other economic, cultural or even sporting 
considerations. That is, this finding does not provide support for hypothesis number five from the 
“cultural” theory. 
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Furthermore, the relation between national pride and European identities is not explored in any of the 
three theories posed above. However there might be some interesting correlations: a recent 
investigation by Belot (2003) points exactly in the same direction regarding the importance of 
national pride (how it is constructed and the elements it lays on) to explain the European identity of 
young British and French people. Finally, our findings in this last part of the section back the 
hypothesis number two from the “civic” theory, since in those countries (Spain and Portugal) that 
give importance to civic elements both at the national and European identity level the measure of 
compatibility is the highest among the countries studied.(20) 
4.4. National and European identities across countries  
Above we raised the question of the consistency across countries of the different meanings of 
national and European identities. In this section, however, we will examine the difference between 
countries in a little more detail. In the previous section we focused on the most important elements 
for national and European identification. However, what is the relative importance of these items 
when compared to other elements of identification? Which emerge as the most important 
components in each country when all of them are analysed at the same time? To answer these 
questions we first ran optimal scaling with each of the variables related to identities included in the 
Standard Eurobarometer 57.2. Then, in line with the theoretical concepts discussed in the previous 
section and confirmed by factor analysis, we constructed a group of parcels representing the 
indicated aspects of the attitudes under consideration. We identified subgroups and then computed 
categories by totalling individual items. Based on these indexes, we created simpler indicators based 
on thirdtiles.(21) We then ran optimal scaling using these parcels, thereby synthesising the 
information in order to cast light on the various debates about national and European identities. 
Figure 1 
Table 8 
In Figure 1 we have plotted countries and closeness to different in-groups and out-groups (either 
internal or external). We see a strong dominant, but trivial, first dimension (see Table 8) that mainly 
distinguishes between overall patterns of sentiments of strong (in the right hand side) versus mild (in 
the left hand side) closeness to different groups. On this first dimension, Hungarians show the 
strongest tendency to feel close to all groups, while, at the other extreme, citizens of the UK and 
Greece show weaker feelings of this kind. The second dimension is more substantial, although 
weaker. 
This second dimension shows variation in attitudes toward groups and also reveals interesting 
differences between items and countries. We see that closeness to village, region and nation are quite 
strongly correlated and cluster together in the upper extreme of the dimension; at the bottom extreme 
we find closeness to out-groups. Closeness to European groups falls in between these two factors. 
From this distribution of the item it can be concluded that national and European identities go more 
or less together, since they are correlated. That is, this analysis again confirms that both kinds of 
identities are more or less compatible.(22) Closeness to out-group and national in-groups, in contrast, 
show a much weaker correlation. On this second dimension, we find that Hungary and Spain are the 
two countries in which the distinction between closeness to national in-groups and out-groups is 
strongest. Spaniards and Hungarians are also more likely to feel close to national in-groups in 
comparison to other countries. 
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At the other extreme we can see that Great Britain is the country in which citizens are most likely not 
to differentiate between national in-groups and European or out-groups, with, as mentioned above, 
weak feelings of closeness to all categories.(23) Other countries fall somewhere in the middle of this 
second dimension. 
Figure 2 
In Figure 2 we calculated the following parcels of items: closeness to village, region and nation went 
into one factor termed natin (closeness to national in-groups); closeness to the EU citizens, 
Europeans fellows and people living in Central and Eastern Europe were grouped together and 
labelled Europe (closeness to European groups); finally we computed all other items as components 
of a third factor named eurout (closeness to out-groups). A + sign indicates strong closeness (it was 
assigned to those in the top thirdtile), and a – sign indicates mild closeness (it was assigned to those 
not belonging to the bottom thirdtile). As can be seen in the graph showing these parcels, this 
analysis does not modify the results of the analysis, reproducing the same distribution of the 
countries on the different dimensions.  
Figure 3 
In Figure 3 we have included our countries and the items from the battery of questions dealing with 
the components of national identity. As in the previous graphs, we find a first dominant but trivial 
dimension, simply reflecting the overall pattern of strong (in the right hand side) or mild (in the left 
hand side) expressions of agreement with the different items. This first dimension runs from the 
strongest agreement with all items on the left hand side to milder agreement on the right hand. This 
highlights in particular the differences between Greece and Poland, with the strongest overall 
agreement, on the one hand, and Germany and Great Britain on the other. The first dimension 
accounts for substantially more variance than the second, but the latter distinguishes more clearly 
among countries (see Table 9). 
Table 9 
This second dimension groups the elements of national identification along the axis, on which 
indicators measuring ethnic-cultural aspects cluster together at the top. At the bottom we find 
another cluster of civic-instrumental indicators, while the symbolic and affective elements are 
located towards the middle. The distribution of countries along this second dimension mainly serves 
to differentiate respondents in Hungary and the Czech Republic, who are more likely to accentuate 
“cultural” backgrounds in their national identification, from those in Spain, who are more likely to 
highlight “instrumental” considerations as foundations for national identity.  
Based on this loading of items(24) and the theories about components of national identities outlined 
above, we have calculated packages of items that summarise the information. These have been 
plotted in a new graph. Common culture, customs and traditions, common language, common 
ancestry and common history and destiny were classified as ethno-cultural components of national 
identification and labelled as nethnic. A national army, common borders and national independence 
and sovereignty were grouped together as reflecting a sovereignty-based conception of national 
identities; we labelled this nsouver. A third bundle, termed nsymbol, comprised feelings of national 
pride, national character and national symbols. Finally, elements pertaining to an instrumental and 
civic understanding of national identification were combined together and labelled nintrum. This 
package includes: common political and legal system; common rights and duties; a common welfare 
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Figure 4 
The first dimension reflects overall patterns of agreement with parcels of national identification; the 
second, more substantial dimension, distinguishes between ethno-cultural elements of national 
identification and all the other packages. On this dimension Hungary is still the country whose 
citizens are most likely to stress ethno-cultural elements of identification with the nation; towards the 
bottom of the dimension we find the Czech Republic and Germany, which are at a considerable 
distance from Hungary. At the top of the axis we found that Great Britain, Spain, Poland, Greece, 
Austria and Italy are all more driven by non-ethno-cultural aspects of national identification. Since 
most of the countries fall more or less in the middle of the second axis we can conclude that both 
ethnic and non-ethnic elements are important for national identification in most countries. 
Figure 5 
Table 10 
Figure 5 shows our countries of analysis together with the battery of questions dealing with the 
configuration of European identities. We can see that the first dimension reproduces what has been 
already seen in earlier graphs. This dimension represents the overall tendency for strong (in the right 
hand side) as opposed to mild (in the left hand side) agreement with all the items. As noted above, 
this dimension is strongest and dominates the second (see Table 10). It serves to distinguish between 
Germany and Great Britain, with the weakest agreement with all the items of European 
identification, at in the left extreme, from newcomers (Eastern European Countries, all in the right 
hand side of the dimension; the only exception is Austria), which are more likely to agree with 
European identification as such overall items. 
The second dimension, although weaker, is more useful to classify countries. On the vertical axis we 
can see the ethno-cultural elements grouped together at the top. All other elements of European 
identification form a second cluster toward the middle of the second dimension. We could label this 
ethno-cultural versus non ethno-cultural elements of European identification. The location of 
countries along this dimension mainly highlights that newcomers (Eastern European countries) are 
more prone to agree with the importance of ethno-cultural elements for European identification. At 
the other extreme we find Italy and Spain, whose citizens largely stress instrumental reasons for their 
European identification. Since Italy is characterised by marked internal, North-South economic 
inequality (north/south), and because of the many scandals involving Italian politicians, Italian 
citizens attach more importance to instrumental aspects of European identity, perhaps in the hope 
that membership of the EU will improve their economic and political situation. Greece appears in an 
outlying position (quite far from any other country or group of countries). This mainly appears to 
reflect the lack of importance of culture as a component of Greeks’ European identification, 
explained by the fact that Greeks consider that culture pertains to the realm of their national 
identities. 
Figure 6 
Just as we did for national identification, we have created bundles of elements of European 
identification and included them in a new graph (Figure 6); these bundles have been compiled in 
accordance with the loading of items as seen in the graph above(25) and the theories about 
components of European identities outlined earlier in this paper.
Seite 14 von 23 EIoP: Text 2004-011: Full Text
29.07.2004 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-011.htm15
The first parcel includes ethno-cultural components: common civilisation, membership of a 
European society with many languages and cultures, common ancestry and common history and 
destiny. This has been labelled eethic. We grouped the EU institutions and emerging common 
political and legal systems, common rights and duties, common system of social protection, the right 
to free movement and residence in any part of the EU and the single European currency as part of a 
second package named einstrum, which comprises both instrumental and civic grounds for 
identifying with Europe. An emerging EU defence system, common borders and sovereignty of the 
EU formed a third factor, bringing together the sovereignty elements of European identification. 
Finally a feeling of pride in being European and a set of EU symbols were combined together as 
elements of pride in European identification (esymbol). 
Optimal scaling reproduces the same dimensions we saw before. Nevertheless, the position of 
countries is rather different on the second substantive dimension. Symbolic elements appear to be 
more important for the definition of Europe (either in positive or negative terms) in Poland, Italy and 
Great Britain than in the other countries.  
Figure 7 
In Figure 7 we try to summarise the analysis in terms of the theoretical dimensions or parcels of 
items. For that purpose we have combined all the dimensions and countries together. As a result, in 
this graph we can see similarities as well as differences among countries; these can be thought of as 
configuring individual country profiles. Greece and Britain have quite unique profiles, which are, 
moreover, the direct opposite to each other. The British are reluctant to agree with the question, feel 
less distant to out-groups, and are the least euro-enthusiastic citizens of all the countries studied; but 
they also feel distant from national symbolic values, ethno-cultural items, etc., generally showing 
less enthusiasm for everything. The Greeks, on the other hand, are more enthusiastic about all items 
and also more inclined towards elements of national identity. Germans and Austrians tend to form a 
cluster, which gradually expands to incorporate other countries in Central and Southern Europe, 
characterised by a middle position between national and European identification. 
Figure 8 
Finally, a correspondence analysis of all items and countries also produces interesting results, 
although the dimensions are more difficult to see and explain (figure 8). In this graph the vertical 
axis reflects national instrumental versus national symbolic identifications. The horizontal axis 
shows the difference between European identification based on culture and civilisation (“cultural” 
theory) versus instrumental identification. To better capture the different countries’ profiles, we will 
focus on the contrast between countries on the extremes of the graph. The variables which are 
mainly responsible for the differences among countries are (1) closeness to Central and Eastern 
Europe and (2) common civilisation and culture for the feeling of being European, both of which are 
most important for the Eastern and Central European countries. Citizens in current member states, on 
the other hand, feel European for largely instrumental reasons. Spain, Germany and Austria identify 
with Europe primarily on civic and institutional grounds. Greece constitutes a somewhat exceptional 
case. Greeks attach considerable importance to symbolic aspects of both their national and European 
identifies. Towards the bottom right of the graph and opening out to the left we find the symbolic 
and sovereignty dimensions of national and European identification. Symbols of national 
identification and pride are important for Greeks above all. Great Britain is close to Greece, although 
British respondents are more prone to mention instrumental components of European identity. 
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5. Discussion-Conclusions  
At the beginning of this article we discussed a number of theories and hypotheses regarding the 
possible sources of European identification and the relation between European and national 
identities. We will now discuss the plausibility and validity of these theories in the light of the 
empirical data and analysis presented above. 
5.1. Empirical evaluation of the “cultural” theory   
The “cultural” theory, and the hypotheses we derived from it, finds only partial support from our 
analysis. Regarding the first hypothesis, our data confirm that attachment to national identities is 
based on “cultural” elements in all the countries analysed (Tables 5 and 6). However, we must reject 
hypothesis number two, regarding the low importance of “cultural” elements for the emergence and 
development of an European identity. “Cultural” elements are not absent from the notion of 
European identity, and are mentioned among the five most important items in most of the countries 
analysed (in Table 7, “language” is mentioned by nine out of ten countries, and a “common 
European civilization” by seven of them). We have found also some support for hypothesis number 
three, that is, attachment to the nation remains stronger than attachment to Europe (Table 4, third 
column). However, European identities are not weaker than national identities because they lack 
“cultural” basis (as just mentioned above, and as part of hypothesis number three suggests). Our 
findings does not support hypothesis four either, since we observe countries (Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, in Table 5) that base both their national and European identity on “cultural” elements, in 
which dual identities holders outnumber exclusive national identity holders, and in which the bonds 
to the nation, though, continue to be stronger than bonds to Europe. Finally, regarding the hypothesis 
number five, the fact that the “cultural” strong attachment to national identities (shown in Table 4) 
has not prevented the emergence, albeit to a greater or lesser extent, of European identities in all the 
countries analysed (Tables 3 and 4) does not support it. 
Summarizing, it should be remembered that authors such as Smith (1999) and Østerud (1999) 
hypothesised that it would be extremely difficult for a European identity to emerge, given a) the 
strength of national “cultural” identities and b) the simultaneous lack of European “cultural” 
elements shared by all Europeans. However, not only has a European identity emerged in all 
countries, as measured by the percentage of dual identity holders (in Table 4), but in most of them 
this European identity does also include “cultural” elements (among the five most relevant), in a 
similar vein to national identities (Tables 5 and 7). Hence, on the one hand we find that national 
identities are still stronger and primarily “cultural”; but on the other hand we find that “cultural” 
attachment to a European identity is also relevant (above all in Eastern and Central European 
countries, but also in other members states). So there is also much more common “cultural” ground 
among the European countries on which to built up a European identity than this theory would 
suggest.(26) 
5.2. Empirical evaluation of the “instrumental” theory  
As for the “instrumental” theory of identity, here our findings have again provided only partial 
confirmation for it, and then only at the European level. Regarding the first hypothesis, that both 
national and European identities are based on instrumental consideration, we have to reject it 
partially. It is true that European identities are primarily “instrumental”, but this is not the case with 
national identities, which are mainly “cultural”, as we just said above (and can be gathered from 
Tables 5, 6 and 7).  
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The second hypothesis is also partially rejected, since European identities are not merely 
“instrumental”. We have seen that “cultural” elements also have a place among the most important 
elements that define an European identity (Tables 5 and 7). Again, it is not true that citizens with 
weaker national identities develop stronger European identities (hypothesis number three) or that in 
those countries with the higher percentage of citizens holding dual, or European, identities holders 
the attachment to the nation is weaker than in countries with higher percentage of exclusive national 
identity holders (hypothesis number four). It is clear from the data in Table 4 that the bonds to the 
nation have remained stronger than the bonds to Europe even in those countries where the large 
majority of citizens are dual identities holders. Therefore, that a citizens develop an European 
identity does not weaken his or her attachment to the nation. 
In short, it must be remembered that, in this theoretical approach, people are seen as ration actors 
who would choose between a national or European identity depending on their perceived costs and 
benefits. However, we have seen that, in broad terms, national identities are mainly based on 
“cultural” components, as opposed to the “instrumental” considerations that are more relevant for 
European identity. This does not mean that “instrumental” elements are of no importance for 
national identities, as exemplified by the cases of Italy or Spain. However, it does show that these 
“instrumental” considerations are much more important at the European level. An important 
inference from this finding is that it would appear unlikely that citizens will transfer their loyalties 
from the nation to Europe based solely on “instrumental” considerations, either at the national or 
European level, since their attachment to each identity is based on different considerations. It is more 
likely that the percentage of dual identities might increase in line with the perceptions of the 
effective functioning of European institutions, but without eroding citizens’ identification with their 
nation. 
The fact that European identities are based mainly on “instrumental” considerations has further 
important implications. It may favour the possibility of the EU being able to create European 
identities by intensifying the perceived (economic or political) benefits of membership. This is the 
vision defended by advocates of the “instrumental” theory. However, it should be noted that in 
countries which stand out for their strong sense of national pride, such as Greece or Great Britain, 
European identification might actually weaken as the perception that the EU is working effectively 
intensifies. Although this hypothesis has yet to be tested, we have found that in these two countries, 
both of which mentioned pride among the five most important components of national identification, 
identities are less compatible even though, as in other countries, “instrumental” considerations were 
mentioned as grounds for European identification. Accordingly, the perception that the EU performs 
better than the nation state could be perceived as a threat to citizens’ national pride (in order for 
national pride to remain high citizens must believe that their own country functions better than the 
EU). 
5.3. Empirical evaluation of the “civic” theory  
In terms of the “civic” theory of identification, our analysis suggests that we are unlikely to see the 
emergence of a European identity based primarily on civic considerations. We have to reject the first 
hypothesis, regarding an European “civic” identity. According to our data, only in three out of nine 
countries did rights and duties figure among the five most important items for citizens’ European 
identifications (Table 7). Nevertheless the cases of Italy and Spain tend to back the hypothesis 
number two, that is, those two countries show that the coexistence of “civic” elements of attachment 
both to the nation and Europe favours the compatibility of national and European identities (Table 
5). 
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The implication, from this second finding, is that it might be possible for European identities (dual 
identities) to spread even in those countries with strong national pride, increasing the perception of 
shared norms and values among all Europeans and particularly among nationals in each country and 
Europeans. It also back the idea that is will be possible to construct a strong civic European demos in 
the future. 
Apart from discussing these theories, we have also considered a number of other questions. First, the 
different analyses presented here clearly show that national and European identities are compatible. 
This finding is not particularly surprising, but a number of further points should be highlighted. First, 
and as mentioned above, our data does not support the idea of a transfer of identity from the national 
to the European level. We hypothesised that these two identities are compatible because they are of 
different order and endowed with different meanings. Different statistical analyses have confirmed 
that this is indeed the case: attachment to national identity is largely “cultural”, while attachment to a 
European identity is primarily “instrumental”. Nonetheless, while this is a pattern common to all 
countries, the level of compatibility of the two kinds of identities varies considerably. Our hypothesis 
on this point it that the particular configuration of national identities in each country gives rise to 
distinctive dynamics and historical inertias that have an impact on the emergence and configuration 
of a European identity. Although we do no have the time or the space to develop this argument here, 
we will mention our four “extreme” cases-study. In the case of Great Britain and Greece, the way 
they have constructed their national identity based on strong feelings of national pride that relate to 
their role as world powers in the past may create a sense of “humiliation” in the need to cooperate 
with others (which in some cases had been ancestral enemies) to keep an status, this need being a 
constant remainder that they have ceased to be the great powers (political, economic or cultural) that 
they were. In the case of Spain and Italy, their contemporary national identity was projected to the 
future, into the EU, not toward the past. Among other factors, in Spain this can be attributed to the 
experience of the Civil War and the dictatorship (the same might well be true for the case of 
Germany); in Italy, to the corruption problems that swept the country in the 1990’s. Having troubles 
to identify with their immediate past, they turned to their integration into the EU as a reason for 
national pride. Therefore, in these cases integration is a remainder that they can do better. 
We were also interested in how these two identities relate to each other. Are they of the same order 
or not? Our analysis seems to suggest that they are perceived as being of a different level, national 
identity constituting an inner circle and European identity an outer circle. 
As a general conclusion, linking all the findings above, we could conclude that national and 
European identity are compatible because they are seen as identities of a different level, bearing 
different meanings. For advocates of more Europe, and for those European politicians interested in 
forging a European identity to serve as one of the legitimatising foundations of the EU, this finding 
could have both positive and negative implications. The good news it that the EU could swell the 
ranks of the citizens with dual identity by further strengthening the performance of the European 
institutions and the benefits they bring (or rather the public’s perception of both).(27) The fact that 
Europeans continue to feel, primarily and in the first place, nationals of their respective countries 
need not be bad news. In fact, if this point were made clear to national governments it might 
facilitate the emergence of the type of European identity that is currently resisted by some member 
states, concerned that it might erode their sovereignty (and the loyalty of their citizens). 
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As a final consideration related to the methodology used here, we have confirmed that national and 
European identities are realities of a different order and bear different meanings. It is mistaken, 
therefore, to address these two identities in public opinion polls through the same kind of questions, 
or even mixing both identities in the same questions as if they were alternatives of the same nature, 
making interviewers artificially select one among a group of possible identities. Questions of the 
type: in the future do you see yourself as more Spanish than European or more European than 
Spanish, are completely mistaken as this research should have shown.  
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Endnotes  
(*) A first draft of this article was presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops held in 
Edinburgh from 28 March to 2 April 2003: Workshop 2, “European culture(s) and European 
Integration”. We would like to thank the participants in that workshop, José I. Torreblanca and the 
anonymous reviewers of EIoP for their valuable comments and criticism. We also thanks the 
European Commission V Framework Program for their financial support (EURONAT project, 
contract no. HPSE-CT2001-00044).  
(1) See the review of existing studies produced by Geetha Garib and Michael Braum for the 
European project PIONEUR (Working paper 4 – July 2003). 
http://www.obets.ua.es/pioneur/documentos_public.php 
(2) For an up-to-date survey and review of the main approaches, see the literature review by Stephen 
Gibson for the project YOUTH AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY. 
http://www.sociology.ed.ac.uk/youth/docs/Gibsons_lit_rev.pdf 
(3) The authors in this group are more empirically driven than those from the other two schools 
discussed here. Moreover, some of them focus on the variable “support for the European 
integration”, which is quite different from a “European identity”. Nonetheless, these two variables 
can also be treated as measuring different aspect of the same reality: they are, in fact, highly 
correlated. It is, therefore, reasonable, to assume that any findings about the reasons for support for 
European integration may also tell us something about why people hold a European identity. 
(4) The inclusion of the last three countries was exceptional, and in these cases the questionnaire 
only incorporated socio-demographic information and questions related to national and European 
identities.  
(5) Further details on the samples are given in the Standard Eurobarometer 57.2 codebook 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/; http://www.nsd.uib.no/cessda/europe.html ) 
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(7) We use the term “internal out-groups” to refer to national minorities which are considered to be 
different by the dominant national group. We define “external out-groups” as those groups coming 
from different countries, such as immigrants. 
(8) These items could have also a significant affective-symbolic dimension. 
(9) These items could also have an important affective-symbolic dimension. More particularly, a 
single European currency may have a strong symbolic value “because a country’s money is a symbol 
of its sovereignty. Support for EMU and the euro, provides, therefore, a crucial test case for whether 
and why European citizens may be willing to transfer power from the nation state to European 
institutions, and it has important implications for the future direction of institution-building within 
the European Union” (Kaltenthaler and Anderson 2001: 141). 
(10) This is also a methodological limitation deriving from the techniques and kind of data used to 
measure identities through the administration of a single questionnaire. As social scientists we were 
confronted by the well-known trade-off between more detailed and sophisticated case studies or 
simplified comparison among countries.  
(11) These two tables (2, 3)compare data from 1995 and 2002. The selection of year and survey has 
been forced by the fact that only the ISSP 1995 included questions on closeness to the nation and 
Europe similar enough to those in the Eurobarometer 57.2. However, the reader should be aware that 
small differences in the wording of questions existed regarding closeness to Europe. Nonetheless we 
the comparison is interesting enough to have included it here. 
(12) It should be noted that the number of people feeling “very close” to the nation has increased in 
Germany and Spain. 
(13) The only exception is if we compare the percentage of those very close and close to the Europe 
in Great Britain in 1995, and the percentage of those very close and close to the European Union in 
2002. 
(14) See also Deflem and Pampel (1996); Carey (2002) and Risse (2001) 
(15) See the column labelled “net percentage of dual identities” in Table 4. 
(16) See the column headed “comparative attachment to national and European identities”. 
Independently of the proportion of the population holding exclusively national or dual identities, this 
column measures the relative strength of attachment to both identities. It is the median value of 
subtracting median identification with the EU from median identification with the nation. A positive 
value indicates that attachment to the nation is stronger than attachment to the EU. 
(17) This analysis does not, however, allow us to compare the profiles of different countries. We can 
see from the Table that ethno-cultural elements are important for national identification in all 
countries, but when the profiles are compared, taking into account all the elements of identification, 
it can be seen that the relative importance of this set of elements varies from one country to another. 
In the following section we present the results of an optimal scaling analysis. This graph shows that 
although ethno-cultural elements are important for all countries, as shown in Table 5, they are 
relatively more important in Hungary, the Czech Republic and East Germany than in Spain, Poland 
and Greece, for example. Hence, analysis based on these findings cannot substitute optimal scaling 
or correspondence analysis, since the latter reveal features of individual countries that the findings 
presented cannot. 
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(national and European at the same time) to the percentage of those holding exclusively national 
identities. 
(19) Lack of experience of European institutions, and the different wording of questions (which were 
logically phrased in the future tense) may account for these differences. However, it should be noted 
that albeit to a lesser extent, Austria and Germany show a similar pattern, suggesting the existence of 
a structural rather than a circumstantial explanation for these variations. 
(20) The importance given to “civic” elements depend, however, on internal dynamic in each 
country: among others, the memory of the past dictatorship in Spain, and corruption scandals in 
Italy. 
(21) We use this term as analogous to the terms percentile, but dividing the population in three equal 
parts instead of one hundred parts. Those belonging to the top thirdtile group received a 1 into the 
category under consideration. 
(22) The optimal scaling analysis that we have performed is based on correlation among items. 
Countries are placed as supplementary variables and have, therefore, no influence on the 
configuration of the space. 
(23) The specific position of this country on the graph also reflects British closeness to North 
American citizens and the Commonwealth in comparison to European groups. 
(24) Tested by factor analysis. 
(25) Tested by factor analysis. 
(26) This is also strongly supported by the findings of qualitative interviews carried on with lay 
people in those same countries. 
(27) While the working of the European institutions is the same across countries the perception about 
them and the percentage of dual identities holders varies. 
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Country Institution Start - End
fieldwork 
Net sample 
size 
EU population
aged 15+ (x 000) 
Belgium INRA BELGIUM 30/04 - 
30/05 1049 8,326
Denmark GfK DANMARK 27/04 - 
10/06 1001 4,338
Germany 
(East) INRA DEUTSCHLAND 03/05 - 
23/05 1023 13,028
Germany 
(West) INRA DEUTSCHLAND 02/05 - 
23/05 1016 55,782
Greece MARKET ANALYSIS 11/05 - 
10/06 1002 8,793
Spain INRA ESPAÑA 06/05 - 
25/05 1000 33,024
France CSA-TMO 10/05 - 
03/06 1007 46,945
Ireland LANSDOWNE Market 
Research
01/05 - 
10/06 991 2,980
Italy INRA Demoskopea 04/05 - 
27/05 1002 49,017
Luxembourg ILRes 07/05 - 
07/06 600 364
The 
Netherlands INTOMART 08/05 - 
10/06 1014 12,705
Austria SPECTRA 02/05 - 
23/05 1018 6,668
Portugal METRIS 04/05 - 
14/05 1000 8,217
Finland MDC MARKETING 
RESEARCH
07/05 - 
04/06 1005 4,165
Sweden GfK SVERIGE 01/05 - 
09/06 1000 7,183
Great Britain MARTIN HAMBLIN LTD 30/04 - 
30/05 1038 46,077
Northern 
Ireland
ULSTER MARKETING 
SURVEYS
06/05 - 
24/05 314 1,273
Czech 
Republic INRA PRAHA 16/05 - 
31/05 1013 7,618
Hungary INRA HUNGARY 10/05 - 
23/05 1027 8,970
Poland IQS and QUANT Group 20/05 - 
30/05 1000 28,866
Total Number of Interviews  16,080 308,885
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Closeness to nation (a) 
SOURCES: ISSP 1995 - National Identity (ZA-No. 2880), Standard Eurobarometer 57.2 (2002).  
(a) Countries are unweighted.  
(b) The question asked in 1995 was "How close do you feel to (R's country)?" The participants responded to this question 
on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = very close; 2 = close; 3 = not very close; 4 = not close at all; 8 = can't choose, don't 
know; 9 = NA, refused).  
Table III 
Closeness to Europe and EU (a) 
Percentage very close  Percentage very close + 
close 
  1995(b) 2002 1995(b) 2002
Germany W 24,2 26,1 79 80,7
Germany E 27,7 29 81,3 73,5
Austria 56,1 30,9 90,8 81,3
Great Britain 24 14,1 70 78,6
Italy 42,9 38,9 70,6 87,8
Spain 42,7 45,8 89,5 89,4
Greece   46,8   84,9
Hungary 79,6 65,9 96,4 96,8
Poland 54,6 42,7 93,9 93,8
Czech R. 47,5 28,4 91,7 71,8
Percentage very close  Percentage very close + close 
  C_1995(b) E_2002(c) EU_2002(d) C_1995(b) E_2002(c) EU_2002(d)
Germany W 11,9 4 5,4 58,8 30 40,8
Germany E 12,2 3 4,4 59,1 29,3 38,7
Austria 27,3 5,5 7,8 68,6 32,4 43,3
Great Britain 4,2 1,8 3 21,3 19,4 27,2
Italy 23 4,2 10,5 69 43,5 58
Spain 20,5 8,1   62,3 40,5 56,4
Greece   5,2 7,8   27,8 35,2
Hungary 75,7 9,7 14,9 94,3 45,8 42
Poland 29 5,2 6,6 70,7 37,1 43,3
Czech R. 30,1 4,9 4,8 80,5 43,2 45,4
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(a) Countries are unweighted.  
(b) The question asked in 1995 was "How close do you feel to (R's relevant continent of subcontinent)?" The participants 
responded to this question on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = very close; 2 = close; 3 = not very close; 4 = not close at 
all; 8 = can't choose, don't know; 9 = NA, refused). Since this question is not coincident with those asked in the Standard 
Eurobarometer 57.2, we have considered two possibilities:  
(c) Closeness to European Union citizens  
(d) Closeness to fellow Europeans (including European Union citizens and people living in countries that are part of the 
European continent but which may not form part of the European Union)  
Table IV 
National versus dual identities and strength of attachments 
(a) Computed from contingency table. This is the percentage of those who are very close or quite close to their nation 
and who simultaneously feel very close or quite close to the EU.  
(b) Computed from contingency table. This is the percentage of the population with dual identities (they very close or 
close both to their nation and the EU) minus the percentage of population with only national identity (very close or close 
to their countries but not very, or not at all, close to the EU). A negative value indicate that most of the of the population 
in the country hold only national identities. A positive value indicates that the percentage of those with dual identities 
outnumbers the percentage of population with only national identification.  
(c) Independently of the percentage of the population holding only national or dual identities, this column measures the 
relative strength of attachment to both identities. It is the median value of substracting median identification with the EU 
from median identification with the nation. A positive value indicates that attachment to the nation is stronger than 
attachment to the EU (that is closeness to the nation is closer). 
 
Percentage of 
population with  
dual identity: national 
and  
European (a) 
Net percentage of 
population  
with dual identities 
(national  
and European) (b) 
Comparative attachment 
to  
national and European 
identities  
(c) 
GERMANY 
WEST 47 -6 .715
GERMANY 
EAST 45 -10 .792
AUSTRIA 51 2 .689
GREAT 
BRITAIN 36 -28 .758
ITALY 64 28 .669
SPAIN 61 22 .718
GREECE 40 -20 1.099
HUNGARY 54 8 1.043
POLAND 46 -8 1.012
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 54 8 .748
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Five most important items for national und European 
identification 
GERMANY EAST  GERMANY WEST 
Five most  
important 
for  
nation 
Five most 
important for  
Europe 
Compatibility 
Five most 
important for 
nation 
Five most 
important for 
Europe
Compatibility
LANGUAGE MOV./RES. Net 
inclusiveness CULTURE MOV./RES. Net 
inclusiveness
CULTURE ECONOMY -10 LANGUAGE ECONOMY -6
ANCESTRY CIVILIZATION Comparative RIGHTS CIVILIZATION Comparative
HISTORY LANG./CULT. attachment ANCESTRY LANG./CULT. attachment
RIGHTS BORDERS ,792 HISTORY BORDERS ,715
AUSTRIA  GREAT BRITAIN 
Five most 
important 
for nation 
Five most 
important for  
Europe 
Compatibility 
Five most 
important for 
nation 
Five most 
important for  
Europe 
Compatibility
LANGUAGE MOV./RES. Net 
inclusiveness LANGUAGE MOV./RES. Net 
inclusiveness
CULTURE CIVILIZATION 2 BORDERS LANG./CULT. -28
BORDERS LANG./CULT. Comparative CULTURE ECONOMY Comparative
RIGHTS BORDERS attachment ANCEST./PRIDE CIVILIZATION attachment
HISTORY RIGHTS ,689 SOVEREIGNTY RIGHTS ,758
ITALY  SPAIN 
Five most 
important 
for nation 
Five most 
important for  
Europe 
Compatibility 
Five most 
important for 
nation 
Five most 
important for  
Europe 
Compatibility
LANGUAGE ECONOMY Net 
inclusiveness LANGUAGE ECONOMY Net 
inclusiveness
CULTURE MOV./RES. 28 CULTURE MOV./RES. 22
ANCESTRY LANG./CULT. Comparative BORDERS LANG./CULT. Comparative
SYMBOLS ARMY attachment RIGHTS RIGHTS attachment
RIGHTS RIGHTS ,669 CHARACTER BORDERS ,718
GREECE  POLAND 
Five most 
important 
for nation 
Five most 
important for  
Europe 
Compatibility 
Five most 
important for 
nation 
Five most 
important for  
Europe 
Compatibility
SYMBOLS MOV./RES. Net 
inclusiveness LANGUAGE CIVILIZATION Net 
inclusiveness
LANGUAGE ECONOMY -20 SYMBOLS MOV./RES. -8
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Eurobarometer 57.2 (2002).  
Table VI 
National identification: items mentioned among the five most 
important 
ANCESTRY BORDERS Comparative ANCESTRY LANG./CULT. Comparativ
PRIDE SOVEREIGNTY attachment HISTORY ECONOMY attachment
HISTORY ARMY 1,099 BORDERS ARMY 1,012
HUNGARY  CZECH REPUBLIC 
Five most 
important 
for nation 
Five most 
important for  
Europe 
Compatibility 
Five most 
important for 
nation 
Five most 
important for  
Europe 
Compatibility
LANGUAGE CIVILIZATION Net 
inclusiveness LANGUAGE CIVILIZATION Net 
inclusiveness
CULTURE LANG./CULT. 8 CULTURE LANG./CULT. 8
HISTORY ECONOMY Comparative SYMBOLS MOV./RES. Comparative
ANCESTRY HISTORY attachment ANCESTRY BORDERS attachment
SYMBOLS PRIDE 1,043 HISTORY PRIDE ,748
LANGUAGE 
Total mention 10: All
Mention in the first place 8: G.E., A, G.B., IT, SP, P, H, CZ
CULTURE 
Total mention 8 : G.E., G.W., A, G.B., IT, SP, H, CZ
Mention in the first place 1: G.W.
ANCESTRY 
Total mention 8: G.E., G.W., G.B., IT, GR, P, H, CZ
Mention in the first place 0
HISTORY 
Total mention 7: G.E., G.W., A, GR, P, H, CZ
Mention in the first place 0
SYMBOLS 
Total mention 5: IT, GR, P, H, CZ
Mention in the first place 0
RIGHTS 
Total mention 5: G.E., G.W., A, IT, SP, 
Mention in the first place 0
BORDERS 
Total mention 4: A, G.B., SP, P
Mention in the first place 0
PRIDE 
Total mention 2: G.B., GR
Mention in the first place 0
SOVEREIGNTY 
Total mention 1: G.B.
Mention in the first place 0
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European identification: items mentioned among the five most 
important 
Table VIII 
Closeness to in-groups and out-groups. Optimal Scaling 
MOV./RES. 
Total mention 9: G.E., G.W., A, G.B., IT, SP, GR, P, CZ
Mention in the first place 5: G.E., G.W., A, G.B., GR
LANG./CULT. 
Total mention 9: G.E., G.W., A, G.B., IT, SP, P, H, CZ
Mention in the first place 0
ECONOMY 
Total mention 8: G.E., G.W., G.B., IT, SP, GR, P, H
Mention in the first place 2: IT, SP
CIVILIZATION 
Total mention 7: G.E., G.W., A,, G.B., P, H, CZ
Mention in the first place 3: P, H, CZ
BORDERS 
Total mention 6: G.E., G.W., A, SP, GR, CZ
Mention in the first place 0
RIGHTS 
Total mention 3: G.B., IT, SP
Mention in the first place 0
ARMY 
Total mention 3: IT, GR, P
Mention in the first place 0
PRIDE 
Total mention 2: H, CZ
Mention in the first place 0
SOVEREIGNTY 
Total mention 1: GR
Mention in the first place 0
HISTORY 
Total mention 1: H
Mention in the first place 0
  Cronbach Alfa Explained Variance 
Dimension   Total  % of variance
1 .897 5.615 46.830
2 .608 2.260 18.830
Total .952 7.875 65.624
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Elements of national identification. Optimal scaling 
Table X 
Elements of European identification. Optimal scaling 
Dimension  Cronbach Alfa Explained Variance
1  .948 8.340
2  .166 1.182
Total  .964 9.523
  Cronbach Alpha Explained Variance 
Dimension   Total % of variance
1 .933 7.481 53.434
2 .308 1.400 10.003
Total .956 8.881 63.438
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Seite 9 von 12 EIoP: Text 2004-011: Tables
29.07.2004 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-011t.htmFigure 4  
 
Figure 5 
Seite 10 von 12 EIoP: Text 2004-011: Tables
29.07.2004 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-011t.htmFigure 6 
 
Figure 7 
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